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Abstract: This paper attempts, via proposing a dilemma, to ex-
pose a serious difficulty in Ernest Sosa's account of epistemic 
justification which he advocates in Epistemic Justification: Inter-
nalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. In his account Sosa 
endorses a dual commitment to non-inferential unmediated 
foundational epistemic justification and his "virtue condition." 
By proceeding through a number of cases I argue that Sosa, 
given his endorsement of non-inferential unmediated founda-
tional justification, must ascent to the conclusion that a person 
who has an intermittent rainman-like ability is foundationally 
justified to believe, for instance, that "this many speckled hen 
has forty-eight speckles." This result, taken in isolation, need not 
prove troubling for Sosa. The trouble, as I illustrate throughout 
the paper, for Sosa results when we try to wed this above com-
mitment of non-inferential unmediated foundationally justified 
belief with his commitment to his virtue condition. 
Ernest Sosa argues in Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Exter-
nalism, Foundations vs. Virtues1 that, in order for a belief P to be epis-
temically justified, P must satisfy conditions of safety and virtue. In 
explicating both of these key notions Sosa writes: 
1 Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. 
Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues (MA; 2003). 
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If a faculty operates to give one a belief, and thereby a piece of 
direct knowledge, one must have an awareness of one's belief 
and its direct source, and the virtue of that source both in gen-
eral and specific instance. Hence it must be that in the circum-
stances one would (most likely) believe P only if P were the case, 
i.e., one's belief must be safe; . . . And, finally, one must grasp 
that one's belief non-accidentally reflects the truth of P through 
accepting an indication of P, thus manifesting a cognitive vir-
tue.2 
And further Sosa makes explicit that, "B is a justified belief only if B 
is a belief acquired through the exercise of one or more epistemic 
virtues." 31 shall refer to this principle as Sosa's virtue condition. 
In this paper I will argue, that, contra Sosa, a justified belief B 
need not be a belief acquired through the exercise of one or more 
epistemic virtues. This is to say, a belief B for subject S can be justi-
fied even if S did not acquire B through one or more of the epistemic 
virtues. In order to undermine Sosa's virtue condition, I will offer a 
case in which an epistemic subject S has a justified belief B, but did 
not acquire B through the use of one or more of the epistemic vir-
tues. The case I will present is especially damaging to Sosa because, as 
I will further argue, Sosa ought to accept (given his commitment to 
a direct acquaintance account of epistemic justification) that in the 
troubling case S's belief B is justified even though it was not acquired 
through the exercise of one or more of the epistemic virtues. But of 
course Sosa cannot accept this result (which I will suggest he is com-
mitted to accepting) given his endorsement of the virtue condition. 
Sosa is caught, I will argue, on the horns of a nasty dilemma. 
Before delving into my proposed case that explicates the major 
difficulty for Sosa, a few points of clarification are worth making. 
Sosa accepts that when a person under normal conditions clearly 
perceives a three-speckled-hen and forms the non-inferential unme-
diated belief that, "my experience is three speckled," then the belief 
is foundationally justified. A normal human epistemic subject's 
"introspective report" of her three-speckled experience is founda-
tionally justified, whereas alternatively a normal human epistemic 
2 Sosa, 170 
1Sosa, 156 
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subject who perceives a forty-eight-speckled hen and forms (through 
a guess) that, "my experience is forty-eight speckled" has an unjus-
tified belief. But why is the belief in the three-speckled case justi-
fied, while the belief in the forty-eight speckled case is unjustified? 
After all, the hen in the forty-eight-speckled case really did have forty-
eight speckles and these speckles really did "present themselves" to 
the epistemic subject in question. Why is the belief that the hen has 
three speckles foundationally justified, while the belief that the hen 
has forty-eight speckles not epistemically justified? 
Richard Feldman explains Sosa's attempt to distinguish the above 
two cases in the following manner: 
Sosa says that to explain the difference we must appeal to more 
than the following three items, (a) the phenomenal character of 
the experience, (b) the propositional content of the occurrent 
thought as one judges the images to contain so many speckles, 
(c) the fit between the phenomenal character and the propo-
sitional content. Sosa proposes that the difference between a 
justified introspective report and an unjustified introspective 
report is that the former is safe and virtuous. To say that a judg-
ment is safe is to say that, "in the circumstances not easily would 
one believe as one does without being right." And a belief is 
virtuous provided it is "derived from a way of forming beliefs 
that is an intellectual virtue, one that in our normal situation 
for forming beliefs would tend to give us beliefs that are safe."4 
Thus, for Sosa the three-speckled belief qualifies as a justified belief 
because it was formed safely through the exercise of an epistemic 
virtue, while the forty-eight-speckled belief is not justified because 
it was not formed through such an exercise. Guessing, which is the 
belief-forming process of the subject who believes the hen has forty-
eight speckles, is not a way of forming beliefs that would tend to pro-
duce safe beliefs and hence the forty-eight- speckled belief fails Sosa's 
virtue condition of justification. Note that the above still holds, for 
Sosa, even if all the hens in the world just happen to have forty-eight 
speckles (perhaps because of some strange natural law). The guess 
that the hen has forty-eight speckles would be safe (and as such sat-
4 Richard Feldman, "Foundational Justification," in Ernest Sosa and his Crit-
ics, ed. John Greco, (MA; 2004) pp. 49-50. 
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isfy Sosa's safety condition), but the belief (even though safe) would 
still fail the virtue condition as guessing does not tend to form safe 
beliefs.5 
Now, having briefly considered Sosa's account of epistemic jus-
tification, I will provide a case that presents a troubling dilemma for 
Sosa's account. 
Consider the following two cases: 
Case One (Jeremy): Jeremy is a normally functioning human epis-
temic agent. When he looks at a speckled hen he can only grasp 
three speckles in an unmediated non-inferential fashion. If the num-
ber of speckles is more than three, then Jeremy must count to arrive 
at the correct number of speckles. On his thirtieth birthday, Jeremy 
wakes up and finds himself with a new and strange "rainman" like 
ability. Jeremy now looks at a hen with forty-eight speckles and in an 
unmediated non-inferential fashion believes in a highly reliable fashion 
that the hen has forty-eight speckles. It's amazing, Jeremy thinks! 
Further, Jeremy is as confident that his belief about the forty-eight 
speckles is true as he was about his three-speckled belief being true 
before he turned thirty. 
Case Two: (Jeremy*) Consider case one as it is and add the modifica-
tion that Jeremy's new found ability "comes and goes" in an unpre-
dictable (but recognizable) fashion. It is as if his rainman-like ability 
flickers. Jeremy* can realize when his "rainman" ability is turned on 
by merely looking at a many-speckled hen. If he looks at the hen 
and thinks to himself, "nope, I just cannot say how many speckles 
without guessing," then the ability is "turned off," but if he thinks to 
himself, "yep, I see it right in front of me and as clear as day that hen 
has forty-eight speckles," then the "rainman" ability is "turned on." 
Here we might compare Jeremy* with a person whose perceptual 
faculty comes and goes or with a person whose memory faculty comes 
and goes. 
Now let us suppose that Jeremy, after his thirtieth birthday, is look-
ing directly at a hen under good lighting conditions and forms the 
unmediated non-inferential belief that the hen has forty-eight speckles. 
5 Feldman in his Sosa and his Critics piece does a very nice job of drawing out 
this important point. 
Epistemic Justification without Virtue 29 
Jeremy's belief, in such circumstances, is justified because the belief 
is "epistemically analogous" to (normal) Jeremy's foundationally jus-
tified belief that the hen has three speckles. An argument to this 
effect would proceed accordingly: 
(1) Jeremy's pre-thirty belief that the hen has three speckles is 
epistemically justified. 
(2) Jeremy's post-thirty belief that the hen has forty-eight speck-
les is epistemically analogous to his pre-thirty belief that the 
hen has three speckles. 
(3) Jeremy's post-thirty belief that the hen has forty-eight speck-
les is epistemically justified. 
A normal human epistemic subject, for instance Jeremy when he is 
twenty-nine, has a reliable faculty of perception. And Jeremy uses 
his reliable faculty to recognize, in an unmediated and non-infer-
ential fashion, that the hen has three speckles. As I noted earlier, 
Sosa, rightly I think, endorses the claim that Jeremy is foundation-
ally justified to believe that the hen has three speckles. This is not in 
dispute. 
Jeremy, after turning thirty, has this same ability of unmediated 
and non-inferential perceptual recognition (and the ability is no less 
reliable). It is just that after Jeremy turns thirty his ability of per-
ceptual recognition is significantly supplemented (it is much more 
sensitive to external stimuli). And if we are to accept that Jeremy 
(when he is twenty-nine) has a justified three-speckled belief, then it 
seems to follow that Jeremy (when he is thirty) has a justified forty-
eight-speckled belief.6 The two beliefs are epistemically analogous 
in that both of them were formed via a reliable, unmediated, and 
non-inferential belief forming process. The two beliefs are indeed 
epistemically analogous. 
Consider that Sosa would have little difficulty accepting the sug-
gestion that upon perceiving (under normal conditions) a hen with 
two speckles, that Jeremy comes to the unmediated non-inferential 
foundationally justified belief that, "the hen has two speckles." The 
two-speckled belief is epistemically analogous to the three-speckled 
6 No doubt, pre-thirty Jeremy does not form the justified belief that the hen 
has forth-eight speckles. Both Sosa and I agree to this. 
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belief, nothing relevant to epistemic justification has changed. But 
this, I offer, is also true in the forty-eight speckled belief formed by 
Jeremy after his thirtieth birthday. Of course, Jeremy's faculty of per-
ception (or some similarly related faculty) went through a dramatic 
improvement, but this should not rule out the forty-eight speckled 
belief as being epistemically analogous to the three-speckled belief. 
After all, people can learn to get better (in ways that are both safe 
and virtuous) at grasping perceptual content in an unmediated and 
non-inferential fashion. They can also get hit on the head and get 
better or worse at such things. In fact, I would highly suspect that 
most normal human epistemic subjects have learned (typically in their 
childhood development) to non-inferentially grasp perceptual content 
(and hence formed justified beliefs) that they were unable to previ-
ously grasp (in their infancy, for instance) in both a safe and virtuous 
fashion. There is no reason why Jeremy must "remain stuck" at only 
being able to be foundationally justified in believing that the hen has 
three speckles (as opposed to say four, six, or, for that matter, forty-
eight speckles). The point is that our epistemic faculties can change 
through learning, age, or happenstance (for better or worse), and the 
plastic nature of our epistemic faculties allows the content of what we 
may be said to be foundationally justified in believing changes as well. 
Let us now consider more closely Jeremy's forty-eight-speckled 
belief. Does this forty-eight-speckled belief satisfy Sosa's safety con-
dition? The answer here is yes, Jeremy's forty-eight-speckled belief 
does satisfy Sosa's safety condition. Jeremy's belief P (that the hen 
has forty-eight speckles) is safe because it is the case that in his cir-
cumstances Jeremy would (most likely) believe P only if P were the 
case. Jeremy believes that the hen has forty-eight speckles because 
the hen does have forty-eight speckles and Jeremy grasps this fact 
in a reliable, unmediated, and non-inferential fashion. Jeremy's rain-
man-like ability allows him to form safe beliefs about many-speckled-
hens. Further, if Jeremy's forty-eight- speckled belief is epistemically 
analogous to his three-speckled belief, then there is no good reason 
at all to suspect that the three-speckled belief would be safe (a view 
Sosa is committed to) while the forty-eight speckled belief would fail 
to be safe. 
Now let us turn to Sosa's virtue condition and ascertain whether 
Jeremy's forty-eight-speckled belief will count, for Sosa, as meeting 
Epistemic Justification without Virtue 31 
this condition. Recall that Sosa's virtue condition states: "B is a justi-
fied belief only if B is a belief acquired through the exercise of one 
or more epistemic virtues."7 Here we should ask, "is Jeremy's forty-
eight-speckled belief acquired through one or more of the epistemic 
virtues?" (This question sets up the beginnings of a dilemma for Sosa 
which will come to fruition when we consider Jeremy*, but before 
exploring this possibility we must allow Sosa to respond to the ques-
tion on the table.) Sosa could maintain that the answer to this ques-
tion is no; that is Jeremy did not acquire his forty-eight-speckled 
belief through one or more of the epistemic virtues. But, if this is 
the case, then Sosa must conclude (given his treatment of epistemic 
virtue as a necessary condition of justified belief) that Jeremy's forty-
eight-speckled belief is not justified. But this, as I suggested above, is 
false and hence not a viable option for Sosa to take. 
But Sosa need not reply negatively to the above question, and 
be straddled with the conclusion that Jeremy's forty-eight-speckled 
belief is not justified (and this would be a very bad result indeed, as 
he is committed, I have argued, to maintaining that Jeremy's forty-
eight-speckled belief is justified). Sosa could answer yes to the ques-
tion and as such allow that Jeremy acquired his forty-eight-speckled 
belief through one or more of the epistemic virtues. Recall that for 
Sosa a belief is virtuous provided it is "derived from a way of forming 
beliefs that is an intellectual virtue, one that in our normal situation 
for forming beliefs would tend to give us beliefs that are safe." 8 It 
does seem as if Jeremy forms his beliefs about the forty-eight-speck-
led hen by the exercise of epistemic virtue in the same fashion that 
he formed his beliefs about three-speckled hens before his thirtieth 
birthday. And, as such, Sosa can argue that Jeremy (though odd in 
his rainman ability) does in fact form his foundationally justified forty-
eight-speckled belief in a fashion consistent with both his safety and 
virtue conditions. 
Here the distinction between the cases involving Jeremy and Jer-
emy* becomes quite relevant. I grant when considering Jeremy, Sosa 
could likely advance a plausible case for suggesting that he acquired 
his justified forty-eight-speckled belief as a result of one or more intel-
7 Sosa, 156 
8 Sosa, 138-9 
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lectual virtues. And, as such, we should have no difficulty (consistent 
with Sosa's account) suggesting that Jeremy's belief that the hen has 
forty-eight speckles is a (foundationally) justified belief. Jeremy (for 
some strange reason due to happenstance) forms a stable rain man-
like perceptual faculty and thus might be plausibly said to both meet 
the virtue condition and be foundationally justified in his forty-eight-
speckled belief. 
The serious difficulty for Sosa comes when we carefully consider 
Jeremy*. Let us grant, in plausible fashion, that Jeremy*'s "flicker-
ing" rainman-like faculty can be constructed in such a way that will 
satisfy Sosa's safety condition. That is, when Jeremy*'s rainman-like 
faculty/ability is "turned on" it allows him to form the ummediated 
non-inferential belief that the hen has forty-eight speckles in a safe 
fashion. Sosa could attempt to resist this move and accordingly try 
to press the point that Jeremy*'s belief (when the rainman faculty 
is "turned on") will not be safe, but this move would, I suspect, fail. 
Recall that Sosa is committed to the view that, "to say that a judg-
ment is safe is to say that in the circumstances not easily would one 
believe as one does without being right."9 The Jeremy and Jeremy* 
cases are set up specifically to ensure that Sosa's safety condition is 
met in both cases. 
Given that the safety condition is satisfied we can now turn 
toward asking whether Jeremy* acquires (when his rainman faculty 
is turned on) his forty-eight-speckled belief through one or more of 
the epistemic virtues. Sosa could end the discussion here and say, 
"no. Jeremy*'s belief fails the virtue condition and thus he fails to 
have the (foundationally) justified belief that, "the hen has forty-eight 
speckles." But Sosa cannot rightly advance this answer to the ques-
tion because Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief (when his rainman 
faculty is turned on) is justified, and if Sosa's virtue condition gives 
us the result that Jeremy*'s forty-eight speckled belief is, under these 
conditions, unjustified then so much the worse for Sosa's virtue con-
dition. Consider the following argument for the claim that Jeremy*'s 
forty-eight-speckled belief is justified: 
(1) Jeremy's forty-eight-speckled belief is justified. 
(2) Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief in case two (the case 
9 Sosa, 138 
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where his rainman faculty/ability is turned on and he rec-
ognizes that it is turned on) is epistemically analogous to 
Jeremy's forty-eight-speckled belief in case one. 
(3) Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief is justified. 
The first premise was argued for earlier in the paper, and its result 
seems undeniable (at least undeniable for one who—as Sosa d o e s -
accepts a direct acquaintance view of epistemic justification). Jere-
my's forty-eight-speckled belief is epistemically analogous to his pre-
thirty, three-speckled belief. His abilities obviously become sharper, 
but the same reasons for thinking that pre-thirty Jeremy was justi-
fied in his three-speckled belief (a claim Sosa assents to) remain in 
the post-thirty forty-eight-speckled case. Additionally, premise two 
is highly plausible. Just imagine Jeremy peering at a forty-eight-
speckled hen alongside his Jeremy* counterpart (under the condi-
tions where Jeremy*'s rainman ability is turned on). The two epis-
temic subjects, under these conditions, are epistemically identical. 
Both agents grasp, in an unmediated and non-inferential fashion, the 
experience of being appeared to forty-eight speckledly in the same 
fashion. It would be absurd to suggest that Jeremy's belief (the hen 
has forty-eight speckles) was justified while Jeremy*'s belief with the 
same propositional and experiencial content was unjustified. 
Sosa does have a reply that he can offer here in response to 
my above defense of premise two. Sosa could suggest that Jeremy* 
forms his forty-eight-speckled belief in a different, nonfoundational, 
way involving his belief that his rainman-like ability is switched on, 
thereby utilizing this belief as an inference that contributes to the 
forty-eight-speckled belief. This reply from Sosa nicely challenges 
whether Jeremy*'s forty-eight speckled belief is, after all, foundation-
ally non-inferentially justified. Let us add to the case (to address this 
worry) that Jeremy* has had his flickering rainman-like ability for 
quite a well, and as such his recognition that his special ability is 
turned on (when he looks at a hen, for instance) is almost second 
nature to him. This is to say he does not consciously deliberate as to 
whether his ability is turned on (or off for that matter) before look-
ing at a hen. Jeremy* does not reflectively base his belief that the hen 
has forty-eight speckles on the further belief that his rainman-like 
ability is turned on, and thus I do not think Sosa's above worry is 
dangerously problematic to the second premise of my argument. 
34 Auslegung 29/1 
Consider the case of a normal human epistemic subject who non-
inferentially grasps in an unmediated fashion that the hen she is look-
ing at has three speckles. Sosa accepts that such a belief is founda-
tionally justified. Now add to this case that the epistemic subject also 
has the belief (not occurring to her often) that her faculty of percep-
tion is reliable. Surely, this case is far from extraordinary. Does such 
a belief about the reliability of her perceptual faculty, on the part 
of a normal human epistemic subject, suggest that her beliefs using 
such a faculty are ruled out from being non-inferentially foundationally 
justified? I would suspect not, especially when this normal epistemic 
subject is not actively contemplating her belief that her faculty of 
perception is reliable. Something like the following principle of infer-
ence might be helpful here: 
Inference Principle (IP): An epistemic subject S forms a 
belief PI in an (conscious and epistemically significant) 
inferential process utilizing another belief P2 only if S 
consciously (actively) weighs or considers P2 in her pro-
cess of forming belief PI . 
There is an important epistemic question here regarding what 
counts (or doesn't count) as an epistemic subject forming her beliefs 
through an inferential process involving another belief. Tentatively, I 
have suggested that the Jeremy* case can be thought of in such a fash-
ion (consistent with IP) that allows his forty-eight speckled belief to 
be formed in a non-inferentially unmediated foundationally justified 
manner. 
Notice, importantly, that Jeremy* realizes if his rainman abili-
ties are working by simply looking at a many-specked-hen. Before he 
looks at the many-speckled-hen he does not consciously deliberate as 
to whether his rainman abilities are "turned on," but as soon as he 
looks at a many-speckled-hen he knows right away if his rainman-like 
ability is working. If the ability is "turned on" then Jeremy* forms 
the reliable, unmediated, and non-inferential belief that the hen has 
forty-eight speckles, if the ability is turned off, then Jeremy* forms' 
the belief that the hen has plenty of speckles but that he cannot tell 
how many speckles the hen has. (Notice that all this is consistent 
with the above stated IP.) Whether Jeremy*'s belief is inferentially 
formed is a separate matter from whether he has a defeater for his 
belief upon perception of a hen. Jeremy*, like Jeremy, has a reliable 
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memory, and as such he knows of his intermittent rainman abilities. 
Jeremy* cannot predict when his special ability is working until he 
looks at a hen, but he does know that the ability comes and goes. 
Thus, there is no obvious defeater present for Jeremy*'s belief that 
the hen has forty-eight speckles. 
Consider that Jeremy* is having a day where his rainman-like 
abilities are "turned on." And thus he looks at a hen and forms the 
foundationally justified belief that the hen has forty-eight speckles. 
Sosa could attempt to argue here that Jeremy*'s, like Jeremy's, belief 
satisfies his virtue condition (and as such has met this necessary con-
dition of justification). Sosa's difficulty is that he cannot plausibly 
advance this suggestion nearly as easily as he might be able to do so 
in the Jeremy case. This is because Jeremy* has a wavering and flicker-
ing disposition and these types of dispositions do not lend themselves 
well to an analysis of virtue. Virtues, and I think Sosa would agree, 
are well-rooted dispositions and do not turn on and off like Jeremy*'s 
intermittent rainman-like disposition. The virtues, be they moral or 
epistemic, do not just come and go; they must be "part of us, of our 
character" in a stable sense to be aptly called virtues. 
If the above analysis of virtue, following in the Aristotelian tra-
dition, is correct, then Sosa is confronted with a serious problem. 
This is because Jeremy*, even though he is foundationally justified 
to believe that the hen has forty-eight speckles, does not acquire 
through the exercise of one or more epistemic virtues the justified 
belief that the hen has forty-eight speckles. Jeremy*'s rainman-like 
faculty (and dispositions) are simply too wavering and unstable to 
satisfy Sosa's virtue condition. Here we see exactly where Sosa is 
stuck on the horns of a nasty dilemma. He could try to argue that 
Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief is not (foundationally) justified, 
but, as I argued earlier, this approach would likely fail, or he could 
try to argue that Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief satisfies his vir-
tue condition, but this approach (just so long as virtues are inconsis-
tent with unstable dispositions) will also likely fail. As such Jeremy* 
represents a counterexample to Sosa's claim that, "B is a justified 
belief only if B is a belief acquired through the exercise of one or 
more epistemic virtues." 1 0 
1 0 Sosa, 156 
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Consider, for a moment, moral, as opposed to epistemic or 
intellectual, virtue. When we think of a courageous person (say, for 
instance, Sally), we note that Sally has a very strong and stable dis-
position to act bravely. Would we think Sally possessed the virtue of 
bravery if we noted that she has the bravery disposition "turned on" at 
intermittent times? Let us add that Sally knows, via her good mem-
ory, that her "moral virtue" flickers on and off, and further that she 
can "sense," when she is confronted with the right situation, when 
her disposition to act bravely is "turned on." Now consider that on 
a random Tuesday Sally possesses the disposition of being brave. Is 
Sally brave on Tuesday—that is does she posses the moral virtue of 
bravery during the Tuesday when her virtue is "turned on"? 1 1 While 
I suspect that different plausible answers could be given to this ques-
tion, I offer that Sally is not brave (in the sense of exercising the 
moral virtue of bravery) in the case thus described. In order for 
Sally to possess the moral virtue of bravery, she would need to have 
a stable disposition to act bravely, and she clearly lacks this stable 
disposition. 
What then do we say of Sally's actions on the Tuesday described 
above? I would suggest that Sally, in that case, is acting as the virtuous 
person would act, but that she herself lacks the moral virtue of cour-
age. Aristotle renders a similar analysis of moral virtue, and it strikes 
me as a suggestion with quite a bit of promise. People who lack 
moral virtue often act in ways that are like (if not qualitatively identi-
cal) to those of people who actually possess moral virtue. Perhaps the 
above consideration will help us better analyze Jeremy*. Tentatively, 
it might be fruitful to consider that Jeremy* acts (when he forms 
the justified forty-eight-speckled belief) as the epistemically (or intel-
lectually) virtuous person would act, but that he himself (like Sally 
above) lacks virtue (in the relevant sense). The idea here is that one 
who fails to possess virtue (of either the moral or epistemic variety) 
can nonetheless act as the virtuous person would have acted but that 
a mere acknowledgement of this will not demonstrate that virtuous 
action qua virtuous action has taken place. Jeremy*, by forming the 
justified belief that the hen has forty-eight speckles in a non-inferen-
1 11 ask the question this way because it is fairly clear that Sally does not 
possess the virtue of bravery when the disposition is "turned off." 
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tial unmediated fashion, acts just as his counterpart Jeremy would 
have acted. The difference is that Jeremy is virtuous, unlike Jeremy*, 
because Jeremy's (mental) action (belief that the hen has forty-eight 
speckles) was produced by an enduring stable disposition, while 
Jeremy*'s was not. As such, it might be right to suggest that Jeremy* 
believes as the epistemically virtuous person would believe, but that 
he himself fails to fulfill Sosa's epistemic virtue condition. 
What can Sosa say in response to the above charge? One pos-
sible reply is to offer an account of how Jeremy*'s belief is, after 
all, one formed through the exercise of an epistemic virtue. Above 
I expressed my skepticism regarding such a move, but Sosa could 
nonetheless suggest the following: on the occasions when Jeremy*'s 
rainman-like ability is working, he does in fact form safe beliefs 
through a process of belief formation that utilizes an epistemic vir-
tue. Jeremy* has a good memory and this allows him to use, albeit in 
an intermittent fashion, his rainman ability in a responsible, reliable, 
and (importantly) virtuous fashion. His beliefs are indeed formed 
through a virtuous belief-forming process and hence my account renders 
the right result in allowing us to count Jeremy*'s belief as (a) founda-
tionally epistemically justified, (b) fulfilling the safety condition, and 
(c) fulfilling the virtue condition. 
How plausible is Sosa's above attempt to suggest that Jeremy*'s 
forty-eight-speckled (justified) belief coheres with his virtue condi-
tion? A problem with assessing just how plausible a case Sosa can offer 
here is that in Epistemic Justification, Sosa does not offer a protracted 
treatment of either his virtue condition or of epistemic (intellectual) 
virtues in general. In fact, it would not be unfair to accuse Sosa of 
offering a putrid account of epistemic virtue. He does note, how-
ever, that, "knowledge (justification) requires one's belief to be not 
only safe but also virtuously sustained, through the use of a reliable 
ability or faculty, through an intellectual virtue." 1 2 Can we say that 
Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief is virtuously sustained through 
an intellectual virtue? Perhaps not, especially when we consider that 
Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief might (given the intermittent 
status of his ability) "turn o f f in the middle of his viewing the many-
speckled-hen. Here we see that it will be much easier for Sosa to 
1 2 Sosa, 139 
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maintain that Jeremy meets his virtue condition than it will be for 
him to maintain that Jeremy* does so. To Sosa's credit he does admit 
in a footnote at the end of his above thought that, "In a fuller treat-
ment these notions need to be clarified, and their virtues displayed 
more fully in a dialectical interplay between main competitors." 1 3 
One worries that, despite this admission, Sosa's treatment of his vir-
tue condition fails to be interestingly informative. 
One significant problem with Sosa's virtue condition is that it 
runs the serious risk of being an ad hoc device that does little more 
than "fill in the blank" for the "thing" when contributing to the safety 
of a belief produces epistemic justification. One spies this possibility 
rearing its head when Sosa notes, "It [a belief] is virtuous because 
one's belief derives from a way of forming beliefs that is an intel-
lectual virtue, one that in our normal way for forming such beliefs 
would tend strongly to give us beliefs that are safe." 1 4 Here we must 
ask, what does Sosa's virtue condition add to his safety condition (or 
to his account of epistemic justification more generally)? A chari-
table reading suggests that Sosa's virtue condition is attempting to 
point in the direction of "that thing" which, "tends strongly to give 
us beliefs that are safe." Sosa, of course, calls "that thing" intellec-
tual virtue, but beyond offering this label, not much more in regard 
to "that thing" (aside from Sosa's suggestion that it produces safe 
beliefs) is forthcoming in Sosa's account. 1 5 
Sosa must do better, I offer, than suggest that Jeremy*'s forty-
eight-speckled belief meets the virtue condition just in case his belief 
is formed through a reliable belief-forming process that produces 
safe beliefs. If this is all Sosa wants to say, then one is at a loss to 
see what substantial work the virtue condition is adding to Sosa's 
account. Why not simply suggest that the virtue condition really just 
amounts to the "appropriately try" condition. That is to suggest that 
1 3 Sosa, 139 (fn.16) 
1 4 Sosa, 138-9 
1 5 This is one of the most frustrating aspects of Sosa's account of epistemic 
justification. One would like so much more than he offers in the way of a treat-
ment of epistemic virtue. Sosa's treatment of his virtue condition is so obscure 
that it makes challenging the idea rather difficult. I am trying to piece together 
as much of his account of the virtue condition as I can without being unfair to 
Sosa. 
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a necessary condition of subject S forming belief P (in a justified 
fashion) is that S "appropriately try" to ensure that her belief is safe. 
Of course, this "appropriately try" condition does not have the same 
ring to the ear as a "virtue condition," but nonetheless one wonders 
how these two conditions really do, for Sosa, relevantly differ. What 
is it about intellectual virtue qua intellectual virtue, for Sosa, (not 
just solely as a means of forming safe beliefs) that serves as a condi-
tion that justifies belief? Sosa never adequately tells us, and this lack 
of explanation opens him to the charge that the virtue condition 
functions as little more than a clause that merely serves as an ad hoc 
device that allows him to loosely "fill in the blank" for the "thing" 
that when contributing to the safety of a belief produces a necessary 
component of justification.1 6 
I have suggested that the intellectual virtues (however they turn 
out to be understood) must be stable dispositions, and that Sosa's 
suggestion of "knowledge (or justification) to be virtuously sustained 
through the use of a reliable faculty, through an intellectual virtue" 
is consistent, in at least broad outline, with this thought. Any proper 
conceptual treatment of epistemic/intellectual (or moral) virtue 
must involve, in the least, an analysis of a stable disposition of one's 
character. But can we offer a plausible account of how Jeremy*'s 
forty-eight-speckled belief is virtuously sustained, through the use of 
reliable faculty, through an intellectual virtue? Jeremy*'s rainman-
like disposition is not, itself, stable, but perhaps more can be said 
here to help Sosa. Below is a rough outline of Sosa's best reply to 
this challenge. 
Jeremy* knows that his rainman-like faculty is itself unstable, but 
we could suggest that Jeremy* has a stable disposition to exercise his 
rainman-like faculty only when he knows the faculty lends itself to the 
safe creation of beliefs. Viewed in this light, the relevant disposition 
1 6 As one might be able to ascertain from the tenor of these last comments 
I am skeptical that epistemic justification is dependent upon a virtue condi-
tion. My own position, in broad outline, is that epistemic justification depends 
upon a "safety condition" and a "responsibility condition". I suspect that deon-
tological accounts of justification (especially when meshed with a Sosa-like 
safety condition) can go much further and offer must more plausible accounts 
of epistemic justification than can accounts of epistemic justification that rely 
on "virtue conditions." 
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that Jeremy* exhibits is quite stable (like an intellectual virtue should 
be). The epistemic faculty that Jeremy*'s disposition "maps up with" 
is unstable; (but no worry) Jeremy*'s disposition (his intellectual vir-
tue) is quite stable. The key to Sosa's move here is to tell a story of how 
the intellectual virtues should be considered in a relativized manner 
consistent with the dispositions of agents who find themselves in var-
ious epistemic situations. The epistemically virtuous normal human 
epistemic subject must be considered differently than Jeremy, and 
likewise Jeremy (or at least Jeremy's intellectual (epistemic) disposi-
tions must be considered differently than Jeremy*'s dispositions. In 
order to assess whether any particular epistemic subject meets the 
virtue condition (with respect to any particular belief), so Sosa could 
argue, we must consider the specific elements of the case at hand 
and ask ourselves, does subject S form his beliefs consistent with 
the "manifestation" of a cognitive virtue? And as I noted above, Sosa 
can make the case that Jeremy* (by forming a type of stable disposi-
tion) does exactly this. Thus, I do accept that it is possible for Sosa 
to advance a positive case for Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief to 
meet the demands of his virtue condition. 
Is Sosa out of the woods? Does he escape the horns of the dilemma 
which I have tried to impale him on throughout this paper? Not so 
fast. First, it is not obvious that his (best) above attempt to reconcile 
Jeremy*'s forty-eight speckles belief with his virtue condition will suc-
ceed. It is certainly not clear that the intellectual virtues (however 
we plausibly understand them) should be relativized in a fashion that 
would allow Sosa to suggest that Jeremy*'s disposition to believe that 
the hen has forty-eight speckles (when he non-inferentially grasps 
this) meets his virtue condition. Just as plausible a move, I suggest, is 
to claim that Jeremy* believes as the virtuous person (Jeremy) would 
believe, but that he himself does not exhibit the intellectual (epis-
temic) virtue given the "intermittent status" of his rainman-like abil-
ity. Like Sally, in our earlier moral case, it is not enough that she has 
the "right dispositions" when her moral sense is switched on, in order 
to exhibit the virtues her actions must flow from a stable morally vir-
tuous character (and the flickering nature of this character) is a strong 
indication that Sally lacks virtue. Virtue is not a "sometimes" type of 
thing; it is much closer to an all-or-nothing expression of one's charac-
ter. Perhaps Sosa could respond here by saying the following: 
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Oh, I was not arguing that Jeremy* was epistemically virtuous 
generally, instead I simply suggested that his (particular men-
tal act) forming the forty-eight-speclded belief meets my virtue 
condition. 
This type of response nicely illustrates just how nuanced a treatment 
of (epistemic) virtue can become, and it certainly goes far beyond 
the treatment of virtue that Sosa offers in Epistemic Justification. But 
this move by Sosa can be given a criticism which runs as follows: 
Sosa, this reply is exactly the type of thought that confuses a vir-
tuous act from an act that would have been virtuous had it been 
performed by a virtuous person. Virtuous acts (or mental acts 
such as forming beliefs) cannot be done by people who are not 
virtuous. And Jeremy*'s, by having an intermittent rainman-like 
epistemic ability, fails to meet this burden. 
The dialectic could continue here for quite some time, but at this 
juncture I merely want to press the point that Sosa's defense of 
Jeremy*'s forty-eight-speckled belief as meeting his virtue condition 
is no easy sell. 
But even if Sosa can escape the dilemma I have presented him 
with, his virtue condition suffers from more general problems. Ear-
lier I expressed the worry that Sosa's virtue condition struggles from 
an ad hoc concern. That is, whenever a reliable belief-forming pro-
cess tends to produce safe beliefs, Sosa can just seem to point to 
"that" and suggest that "it" meets the virtue condition. Just how seri-
ously this concern falls prey to ad hoc objections I will not explore 
here, but the worry does exist and it strikes me as a serious difficulty 
for Sosa's virtue condition independently of whether or not he can 
account for the Jeremy* case. 
I would like to end by noting that there is something right about 
Sosa's desire to incorporate a condition in his account of epistemic 
justification that speaks to the "appropriate epistemic attitude" of the 
epistemic subject. But I offer that his virtue condition is the wrong 
way to go about considering this important aspect of epistemic jus-
tification. If we want to express a desire to clearly capture a work-
able notion of an appropriate epistemic attitude we would be best to 
pursue the notion of epistemic responsibility (as opposed to epistemic 
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virtue). Jeremy and Jeremy* are both forming their safe beliefs that 
the hen has forty-eight speckles in a responsible fashion, and it is this 
key notion of epistemic responsibility(they are both appropriately 
trying to engage in safe beliefs) which better explains (as opposed to 
Sosa's virtue condition) why the two very different epistemic subject 
both have the justified belief that the hen has forty-eight speckles. 
Part of the reason why talk of epistemic responsibility is superior 
to talk of (epistemic) virtue is because responsible actions (beliefs) 
can be parsed up into discrete individual components much easier. 
A person can believe responsibly on Tuesday and irresponsibly on 
Wednesday (I can appropriately try to form safe beliefs in respect to 
belief X but fail in this charge in respect to belief Y), but the same 
parsing might not be available in the case of virtuous belief-forming 
processes. 
In conclusion, I have used this paper as an opportunity to chal-
lenge Sosa's virtue condition with a counterexample (based upon an 
intermittent rainman case) that sought to impale Sosa on the horns 
of a dilemma. In considering Sosa's replies I offered a means in which 
Sosa might be able to escape the horns of my proposed dilemma (but 
this escape is not a case of clear sailing past the horns for Sosa). Addi-
tionally, I explored the worry that Sosa's virtue condition is both 
under-informative as well as an open door for ad hoc trouble. Toward 
the end of the paper I defended, in broad outline, the notion that 
the key element of an appropriate epistemic attitude to which Sosa 
is trying to capture is best (and most clearly) done through talk of 
responsibility as opposed to talk of virtue. Whether Sosa can defend 
the virtue condition in tight of these worries is an interesting con-
sideration which I will not pursue further than I already have. This 
paper has shown that much more of a defense, on Sosa's and others 
part, is needed if the virtue condition for epistemic justification is to 
survive some very pressing questions.17 
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